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INTRODUCTION

Who sets the norms for the ways in which American
public companies are governed? There are, of course, many
answers to this question: the Delaware Supreme Court,
influential scholars and other norm entrepreneurs, members
of Congress through well-intentioned legislation, the New
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ through their listing
standards, the Business Roundtable through its lobbying
and litigation, institutional investors, and the "market"
generally.
Plaintiffs' lawyers, too, have become influential in
shaping corporate governance norms. Class counsel have
resolved many derivative suits and shareholder class actions
in recent years with what are known as "therapeutic"
settlements. 1 These are settlements in which corporate
defendants agree to restructure their boards, reconfigure
their governance arrangements, hire additional staff, and
improve their legal compliance programs. 2 Therapeutic
settlements in private litigation have also included
provisions for annual, rather than staggered, elections of
directors; shareholder access to the proxy ballot; and creation
of the position oflead director. 3
1

The use of the term "therapeutics" derives from the use of the term
"corporate therapeutics" in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
396 (1970) (citing Murphy v. N. Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567,
570 (S.D.N.Y 1940)).
2
See, e.g., Harry R. Webber, Home Depot Settling Several Shareholder
Suits, Attorneys to Get $14.5M, Law.com, Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.law.com
/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005561185 (noting defendant's agreement to adopt
several corporate governance practices as part of a settlement agreement);
Mary Pat Gallagher, Plaintiffs Lawyers Split $9.5M Fee in Shareholder
Suit Against Schering-Plough, Law.com, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1200305133047 (noting defendant's agreement to
create a staggered board, change the compensation scheme for directors,
and centralize global compliance and audit functions); Ashby Jones, Firms
Settle Backdating Suits-Some Private Cases End in Agreements; More
Deals Ahead?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A15 (noting that Barnes &
Noble had adopted fifteen governance changes in response to a lawsuit).
3
Phyllis Plitch, Governance at Gunpoint: To Get Companies to Change
Their Rules, Shareholders are Dangling a Powerful Carrot: Litigation
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Prosecutors in federal criminal cases have also influenced
corporate governance norms. Through the use of deferred
prosecution agreements which often impose structural
obligations on corporate defendants, Department of Justice
lawyers, like plaintiffs' lawyers, have engineered many "deep
governance reforms."4 These reforms have included the
appointment
of
an
independent
monitor, 5
the
implementation of a detailed legal compliance program, 6
specific
prescriptions
regarding
management's
7
communications with outside auditors, splitting the
positions of CEO and Chairman, 8 and the appointment of
additional outside directors. 9
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), too, has
been tinkering with corporate governance norms.
It
accomplishes this mission in the course of settling its civil
enforcement actions. 1° For many years, the Commission has
Settlement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R6. Other settlements include a
ban on the use of stock options to compensate directors and replacement of
the Chairman and CEO. See E. Scott Reckard, Homestore to Settle Suit by
Investors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at Bus. 1; Daniel Wagner & Kristina
Fiore, DHB Deal Means Chiefs Ouster, NEWSDAY, July 14, 2006, at A48.
4
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV.
853, 853 (2007).
5
Twenty-one of the thirty-five deferred prosecution agreements
adopted by the DOJ from January 2003 - January 2007 included the
appointment of an independent monitor. Id. at Appendix A. "The
monitors may become involved in uncovering and remedying new
criminality totally unrelated to the agreement." Id. at 898.
6
Id. ("These compliance programs are often sweeping, affecting both
top management and low level employees.").
7
See Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the
Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (2006) (describing the terms
of the agreement, including a requirement that the CEO, CFO, General
Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer meet with the auditors at least
quarterly).
8
Id. at 1052.
9
Id. at 1053.
10
See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives
"Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels": Corporate Fraud, Equitable
Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42
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settled
cases
with
therapeutic
provisiOns
called
"undertakings." In recent years, these undertakings have
required the creation of new management positions, adoption
of new accounting and reporting practices, reconfiguration of
corporate training programs, and establishment of specific
board-level committees and procedures. 11 Sometimes, the
terms of SEC settlements require boards of directors to
replace senior-level managers, engage and empower outside
consultants, and overhaul a variety of financial and business
practices. 12
One might ask whether the SEC has the expertise to
design desirable corporate governance changes or whether
the therapeutic provisions the Commission has demanded
are the right ones or the best ones for the corporate
defendants in question. (Similar questions have been asked
about the expertise of plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients
and the value, if any, of the therapeutic settlements achieved
in shareholder class actions. 13 The same questions have been
asked quite aggressively about the expertise of federal
prosecutors dealing with allegations of organizational
crime.) 14 One might also ask if the widespread reliance by
the SEC on compliance consultants-a costly and intrusive
practice-has become a matter of habit whose cost exceeds
its benefits. Recent press coverage suggests that the use of
such consultants may be a boondoggle-a way to reward
former government staffers with lucrative contracts of little
value to investors. 15
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 627, 654 (2007) ("The SEC has too few resources for
all the work it is asked to do, and hence seeks settlement rather than
continued litigation of its enforcement actions.").
11
See infra Part II.
12 Id.
13
Louis Lavelle, Smoke, Mirrors, and Shareholder Settlements, Bus.
WK., Sept. 6, 2004, at 75.
14
Garrett, supra note 4, at 933-35.
15
See Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Contract for His Firm; Democrats
Questioning No·Bid Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008, at A3; Carrie
Johnson, Ex-Officials Benefit From Corporate Clean-Up, WASH. POST, Jan.
15, 2008, at Al. The issue of cronyism in the selection of consultants
(called "monitors") in criminal cases was aired in Congressional hearings
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This Article explores the use by the SEC of corporate
therapeutics as a remedial tool. I will begin by examining
the kinds of "therapeutics" the Commission currently favors 16
as well as the process by which therapeutic settlements are
reachedY
I will then explore the question of agency
expertise. 18 Does the SEC really add value to companies
whose governance structures and procedures it alters? It is
one thing for the SEC to demand structural changes at
regulated entities such as brokerage firms or stock
exchanges where it arguably has industry-specific expertise.
It is quite another to imagine that the SEC has unique
insights into the optimum governance practices of companies
in every industry.
Apart from the question of experti.se there is the question
of ultimate efficacy. Research suggests that most corporate
governance arrangements have little or no impact on
shareholder value. 19 Many legal compliance programs, too,
may provide atmospherics but in fact do very little to
improve a company's value. 20 Some compliance programs are
a farce. 21 So, why does the SEC insist upon these arrangements? And what .evidence do we have that therapeutic
settlements like those favored by the SEC have the intended
effect of protecting investors or maximizing wealth?
In addition to exploring the theory behind therapeutic
settlements, this Article will explore some of the strategic
considerations surrounding the use of therapeutic sanctions.
How do SEC enforcement lawyers construct a menu of
therapeutic options when they enter into settlement
discussions? Is the list custom-tailored or cut-and-pasted
from prior cases? (Or, are therapeutic provisions a product
in March, 2008.

The Department of Justice has now issued guidelines
governing selection of monitors. See Steven R. Peikin, New Guidelines for
Corporate Monitors, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 2008, at 4.
16
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Parts III & IV.
18
See infra Part VI.
19
See infra Part VII.
2o Id.
21
See infra Part VIII.
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of the defendant's initiative?) How does the SEC approach
the tradeoff between monetary payouts and therapeutic
sanctions?
This Article incorporates the results of
confidential interviews with several lawyers who handle
SEC enforcement actions, both on the defense side and in the
Enforcement Division of the SEC. Their comments provide
useful insight into the priorities of the Enforcement staff as
well as the strategies of corporate clients.
The conclusion of this Article is a policy prescription. 22
The SEC has been admirably forthcoming in articulating its
policies regarding the imposition of civil penalties against
corporations. 23
I will propose that the SEC similarly
articulate its policies regarding the use of therapeutic
sanctions.

II. THE SEC'S USE OF CORPORATE
THERAPEUTICS
The SEC in recent years has often negotiated therapeutic
settlements
addressing
corporate
governance
and
operational arrangements. These settlements may be placed
on an "intrusiveness" continuum as follows:

22

See infra Part X.
See Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter Statement Concerning Financial Penalties)
(describing the framework for determining civil penalties) .
23
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Cease-and-
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Most
Intrusive
Defendant

desist order must under-

Defendant

Defendant must engage a

Appointment

must hire new

consultant approved by the

of a Monitor

SEC staff; the consultant will

with broad

take remedial executives and
efforts, then

staff and

make findings and recom-

oversight

report on the

initiate new

mendations for future pro-

authority

results to the
SEC

programs and grams and practices; defendant
practices

must adopt and implement the
consultant's recommendations

Working from the least intrusive to the most intrusive
provisions, 24 we begin with settlements like that involving
Cummins, Inc. 25
In that case, the SEC alleged that
Cummins had failed in some details of its accounting
practices, resulting in a restatement of its financials for the
preceding three years. Citing the company's self-reporting of
its violations and voluntary remedial efforts (which are not
described), the SEC settled the case by requiring Cummins
to cease-and-desist from further violations of specified SEC
rules. 26
At the next point on the scale, we have the settlement in
a case involving Bear, Stearns & Company, a financial
services company regulated by the SEC. In this case, the
24

Some settlements, of course, include no therapeutic provisions for
reasons that will be discussed in Part IV. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. ("Freddie Mac"), Litigation Release No. 20,304, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 2277 (Sept. 27, 2007) (describing settlement of a major fraud case
for a $50 million civil penalty with no accompanying therapeutic
sanctions); In re Raytheon Co., Exchange Act Release No. 54,057, 2006
SEC LEXIS 1501 (June 28, 2006) (noting a settlement by payment of a $12
million civil penalty).
25
In re Cummins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 53,236, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 246 (Feb. 7, 2006).
26
Id. at *13-14. See also In re Consulting Servs. Group, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,612, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2354 (Oct. 4, 2007)
(detailing the defendant's voluntary remedial efforts, then imposing a
cease-and-desist order).
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SEC alleged violations of the "gun-jumping" rule, when Bear,
Stearns brokers sent unauthorized e-mails to their clients
during IPO "quiet periods.'027 Bear, Stearns was alleged to
have failed to provide adequate supervision of its brokers
and to have insufficient control systems to detect and deter
the sending of the unauthorized e-mails. The settlement
required only that Bear, Stearns review its procedures and
"certify to the Commission in writing that it has completed
its review and that it has established procedures ... which
are reasonably expected to prevent and detect, insofar as
practicable, [future] violations of Section 5."28 There was no
cease-and-desist order and no financial penalty.
At the center of the intrusiveness scale, we have the
Qwest Communications settlement. In October 2004, the
SEC charged Qwest with fraudulently recognizing over $3.8
billion in revenue in a "multifaceted fraudulent scheme to
meet optimistic and unsupportable revenue and earnings
projections.''29 In settling the case, Qwest agreed to pay a
$250 million civil penalty. It also agreed to create a new
position of Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) whose charge
would be to ensure the company complies with the federal
The CCO would report directly to a
securities laws.
committee of outside directors. 30
The McAfee settlement offers an example at the next
point on the scale. In January 2006, the SEC charged
McAfee, Inc. with overstating its revenue and earnings by
hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint specifically
alleged that, during the period 1998-2000, McAfee inflated
its cumulative net revenues by $622 million. 31 In settling the
case, McAfee agreed to pay a $50 million civil penalty and
27
In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8756,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,806, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2701, at *2 (Nov. 21,
2006).
28
Id. at *20.
29
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,936, 2004
SEC LEXIS 2403 (Oct. 21, 2004).
3o Id.
31
McAfee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,520, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2360
(Jan. 4, 2006).
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submit to the entry of an "obey-the-law" injunction. 32 In
addition, McMee agreed to engage an independent
consultant to examine and recommend improvements to
McMee's internal accounting controls. 33
Finally, the WorldCom case offers an example of a
settlement of a civil enforcement action at the "most
intrusive" point on the scale. The settlement in WorldCom
resulted in the appointment of a full-service monitor with
exceptional powers. 34 Typically, as happened here, fullservice monitors are appointed only in cases involving
concurrent criminal charges brought by the Department of
Justice. 35
These settlements, among scores involving therapeutic
provisions, illustrate the types of options available in
settlement negotiations with the SEC Enforcement Division.
Let us look for a moment more specifically at some of the
most common therapeutic prescriptions demanded by the
SEC staff in recent years.

32

Id. An "obey-the-law" injunction is one that directs the defendant
to observe the requirements of certain enumerated statutes or regulations
(e.g., the defendant shall not violate Rule 10b-5).
Some courts have
questioned the legitimacy of such injunctions. SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d
1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) ("[T]his court has held repeatedly that 'obeythe-law' injunctions are unenforceable.").
33
McMee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,520, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2360
(Jan. 4, 2006).
34
See Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J . CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 89, 94-99 (2006)
(describing the appointment and activities of the WorldCom monitor,
Richard Breeden).
35
See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007)
(describing the use of corporate monitors in criminal cases, including cases
involving the SEC); Sue Reisinger, Someone to Watch Over You, CORP.
CsL., Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/indPubArticle
IHC.jsp?id=ll90192571246 (describing the use of monitors in 28 criminal
cases).
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A. New Management Structures and Personnel
Sometimes, as in the Qwest settlement, 36 the SEC insists
upon the creation of new compliance bureaucracies. Often,
this means simply the creation of a new senior management
position. Minuteman International, Inc., for example, agreed
to create the position of Chief Accounting Officer. 37 Charter
Communications, Inc. agreed to create a position known as
Corporate Director of Credit and Collections. 38 It may also,
however, involve the creation of complete departments and
new reporting structures.
An extreme example involves Columbia Management
Advisors. In response to allegations that the company had
favored certain mutual fund clients and permitted them to
engage in "market timing," Columbia's settlement with the
SEC included the creation of a completely new "Compliance
and Oversight Structure."39 The settlement required the
creation of a Code of Ethics Oversight Committee comprised
of senior executives who would meet quarterly; the creation
of an Internal Compliance Controls Committee; the creation
of a new full-time senior-level position to address conflicts of
interest; the establishment of an employee-ombudsman
position; and a commitment by the chief compliance officer to
make quarterly reports to the fund's outside directors
(known in this case as "independent trustees"). 40 The
settlement also required a biennial outside review of the
defendant's compliance programsY

36

See Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,936, 2004
SEC LEXIS 2403 (Oct. 21, 2004).
37
In re Minuteman Int'l, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 47,894, 2003
SEC LEXIS 1228, at *16 (May 21, 2003).
36
In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,098,
2004 SEC LEXIS 1589, at *15 (July 27, 2004).
39
In re Columbia Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No.
8534, Exchange Act Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,752, 2005 SEC LEXIS 289, at *8, 48-62 (Feb. 9, 2005).
40
Id. at *49-52.
41
Id. at *62.

HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 802 2008

No. 3:793]

CORPORATE THERAPEUTICS AT THE SEC

803

Other SEC settlements have required the creation of
senior-level compliance or oversight committees, 42 check-andbalance procedures to guard against improper professional
conduct, 43 and specific assignments and day-to-day practices
designed to minimize risk. 44 In a handful of cases involving
accounting firms, the settlement terms have also included
revision of the defendant's business model and withdrawal
from certain markets. 45
B. New Board-Level Structures and Board Practices
In addition to new management structures and personnel
assignments, the SEC occasionally also requires the creation
ofboard-level committees and new board procedures. Recent
settlements have included provisions for creation of
42

See, e.g., In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No.
8668, Exchange Act Release No. 53,490, Investment Company Act Release
No. 27,262, 2006 SEC LEXIS 623, at *81-82 (Mar. 16, 2006). In re
Millennium Partners, L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8639, Exchange Act
Release No. 52,863, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,172, 2005
SEC LEXIS 3078, at *27 (Dec. 1, 2005).
In at least one settlement, the composition of the compliance committee
was specified: "to be chaired by the Vice President, Securities Compliance
of Hartford Life, [and to include) senior business leaders from the
Investment Products Division, at least one member of Hartford Life's legal
department and at least one member of the Disclosure Review
Committee." In re Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, Securities Act Release
No. 8750, Exchange Act Release No. 54,720, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,549, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2571, at *21 (Nov. 8, 2006).
43
In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,564, 2004 SEC
LEXIS 2388, at *42 (Oct. 20, 2004) (requiring the firm's auditors to consult
with the Department of Professional Practice under enumerated
circumstances, and to have the Department of Professional Practice review
and approve documents for certain clients).
44
In re PKF, Securities Act Release No. 8675, Exchange Act Release
No. 53,633, 2006 SEC LEXIS 833, at *44 (Apr. 12, 2006) (requiring the
firm to involve a Quality Control and Compliance Partner in all audit
engagements of ''high risk" clients).
45
Id. (prohibiting the firm from taking on any new U.S. public
company audit clients for a period of one year); In reGrant Thornton LLP,
Exchange Act Release No. 50,148, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1703, at *50 (Aug. 5,
2004) (prohibiting the firm from engaging in joint audits for a period of
five years).
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temporary committees to select the outside consultants who
will devise corrective post-settlement measures, 46 creation of
permanent committees to oversee ongoing compliance
activities, 47 and specific tasks for compliance and audit
committees. 48 Settlements frequently call for enhancements
to training programs for members of the board. 49 They
sometimes also require expansion of the board and even may
include a statement of qualifications for board membership. 5°
In rare cases (typically those also involving criminal
prosecution), we find more intrusive provisions at the board
level: the separation of the positions of Chairman and CE0; 51
the amendment of bylaws to create term limits for outside
directors; 52 and the appointment of an "Inspector General"
who reports directly to the Audit Committee. 53 In a few
46
In re Akorn, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,546, 2003 SEC
LEXIS 2276, at *13 (Sept. 25, 2003).
47
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,891, 2004
SEC LEXIS 2157, at *7 (Sept. 22, 2004) (creating a new Compliance
Committee of the Board of Directors).
48
In re Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs. LLC, Securities Act Release No.
8750, Exchange Act Release No. 54,720, Investment Company Act 27,549,
2006 SEC LEXIS 2571, at *21 (Nov. 8, 2006) (requiring an annual
presentation to the board's Compliance Committee, including a thorough
review of the company's revenue sharing arrangements); In re Coca Cola
Co., Securities Act Release No. 8569, Exchange Act Release No. 51,565,
2005 SEC LEXIS 861, at *23 (Apr. 18, 2005) (requiring the Audit
Committee to generate a set of criteria for use in the preparation of the
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the company's
public filings).
49
In re Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act
Release No. 53,049, 2006 SEC LEXIS 8, at *14 (Jan. 4, 2006).
50
In re Microstrategy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43,724, 2000
SEC LEXIS 2764, at *21 (Dec. 14, 2000) (requiring the appointment of an
additional independent board member who shall have prior experience as
a Chief Financial Officer of a public company or as a member of a public
company Audit Committee).
61
Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., Litigation Release No. 18,803,
Accounting & Auditing Release No. 2065, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1631, at *5
(July 28, 2004).
52 Id.
63
HealthSouth Corp., Litigation Release No. 19,280, 2005 SEC LEXIS
1480, at *2 (June 23, 2005).
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cases involving regulated entities, we find additional
provisions aimed at the board of directors: a requirement
that the chairman be an independent director with no prior
involvement in the allegations brought by the SEC; 54 a
limitation on the number of incumbent directors who may
continue to serve as members of the board; 55 and a requirement that future decisions receive a majority vote of
independent directors. 56 Generally though, and especially in
cases involving public issuers, we rarely see "deep
governance reforms" 57 incorporated into SEC civil
settlements. Indeed, the Commission expressly disclaims
any interest in intruding into high-level corporate
governance decisions in cases involving public issuers. 58
54
In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No.
8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *61 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Columbia
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,752, 2005
SEC LEXIS 289, at *43 (Feb. 9, 2005).
55
In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No.
8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *60 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Columbia
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,752, 2005
SEC LEXIS 289, at *43 (Feb. 9, 2005).
56
In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No.
8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *62 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Columbia
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,752, 2005
SEC LEXIS 289, at *44 (Feb. 9, 2005).
57
See Garrett, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
56
See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,485,
2005 SEC LEXIS 3124, at *3 (Dec. 5, 2005).

The remedial undertakings [in this case] include
appointment of new Chief Executive and Financial
Officers, creation of an independent audit committee and
majority independent board of directors, and retention of
an independent consultant to analyze the company's
internal accounting controls, recommend improvements
and oversee implementation of those improvements. These
undertakings represent an unusual departure from the
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C. Employee Training Programs
Often, the problem giving rise to systemic fraud is
exacerbated by the lack of appropriate training and feedback
for employees, especially professional employees involved in
a company's finance or reporting functions. Thus, many SEC
settlements call for the development of employee training
programs. In settlements involving the accounting firms
Grant Thornton and Ernst & Young, for example, the firms
were required to provide their audit professionals with fraud
detection training conducted by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners. 59 A settlement with KPMG required retraining for all of the firm's partners and managers. 60 A
settlement with the Boston Stock Exchange required the
Exchange to provide re-training for its regulatory staff. 61

D. Engagement of Compliance Consultants
One of the most common therapeutic sanctions in SEC
settlements is an order to hire an outside consultant to guide
Commission's policy of limited intrusion into corporate
governance, but were required by the unique facts of this
case: the company's current two person board of directors
consists of its Chairman, President and CEO Kushner who
will not be barred from serving as an officer or director of
any public company, and its Principal Financial and
Accounting Officer James DiLorenzo who is a defendant
litigating similar charges of fraud brought by the
Commission. Further, Kushner and DiLorenzo collectively
are beneficial owners of 45% of the company's outstanding
voting shares.
Id. (emphasis added).
59
In reGrant Thornton LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,148, 2004
SEC LEXIS 1703, at *50 (Aug. 5, 2004); In re Ernst & Young Chartered
Accountants, Exchange Act Release No. 56,104, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1593, at
*29 (July 19, 2007).
60
In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,564, 2004 SEC
LEXIS 2388, at *41 (Oct. 20, 2004).
61
In re Boston Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56,352,
2007 SEC LEXIS 1961, at *17 (Sept. 5, 2007). See also In reAm. Stock
Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55,507, 2007 SEC LEXIS 535, at
*35 (Mar. 22, 2007) (requiring re-training for all floor staff).
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the company in improving its financial reporting procedures.
This type of sanction has been praised by some scholars as
an ideal bridge between self-regulation and traditional,
command-and-control regulation. 62
The theory is that
engagement of a consultant to devise remedial strategies
creates "a temporal, structural, and dialogical space for
trying to work through stubborn cultural problems."63
In a case alleging that ConAgra had under-reported its
tax liabilities by $105 million, for example, the SEC required
that ConAgra engage an independent consultant to review
the company's policies and procedures with respect to
reporting certain reserve accounts and prescribe a menu of
operational reforms. 64 In a case involving Akorn, Inc., the
SEC required engagement of an independent consultant to
review the company's policies and procedures with respect to
accounts receivable. 65
Consultants may address a broad range of issues
affecting a company's accounting and reporting practicesthe adequacy of a company's compliance resources (including
staffing and compensation), 66 the adequacy of procedures for
handling inventory valuation, 67 the relationship between
sales and finance employees m revenue recognition
62

David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, CORNELL INT'L L. J .
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1029849 (arguing that when undertaken with care, independent
monitoring provides the best available means for addressing problems of
organizational culture).
63
Id. (manuscript at 41).
64
ConAgra Foods, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20,206, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 1610, at *6 (July 25, 2007). In addition, ConAgra had to pay a $45
million civil penalty and consent to an obey-the-law injunction. Id. at *5.
65
In re Akorn, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,546, 2003 SEC
LEXIS 2276, at *13 (Sept. 25, 2003).
66
In re Boston Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56,352,
2007 SEC LEXIS 1961, at *17 (Sept. 5, 2007) (requiring the defendant to
retain an independent auditor to evaluate the adequacy of the company's
resources, including staffing and compensation, related to surveillance,
investigation, examination, and disciplinary programs).
67
In re Warnaco Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,675, 2004
SEC LEXIS 955, at *38 (May 11, 2004).
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determinations, 68 the mechanics of signing and dating sales
contracts and purchase orders and the generation of sales
invoices to customers, 69 and a company's practices with
respect to disclosure generally. 70
Consultants may also address other systemic issues.
They have been charged with designing procedures for
avoiding liability for foreign payments under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 71 procedures governing the misuse of
non-public information, 72 regulations governing travel and
entertainment expenses, 73 systems for receipt and retention
of e-mail communications, 74 and even pricing policies. 75 Once
adopted, the consultants' recommendations themselves
become subject to periodic review by other consultants. 76

68
In re Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act
Release No. 53,049, 2006 SEC LEXIS 8, at *14 (Jan. 4, 2006).
69
In re Aspen Tech., Inc. , Securities Act Release No. 8827, Exchange
Act Release No. 56,170, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1656, at *23 (July 31, 2007).
7
° Cardinal Health, Inc. , Litigation Release No. 20,212, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 1622, at *4 (July 26, 2007) (in addition to paying a $35 million civil
penalty, the company agreed to retain an independent consultant to
conduct a review of its disclosure practices).
71
In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54,599, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 2321, at *21 (Oct. 13, 2006).
72
In re Hutchens Inv. Mgmt. Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Release No. 2514, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1039, at *15 (May 9, 2006).
73
In re Jeffries & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 54,861, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 2813, at *12 (Dec. 1, 2006).
74
In re Kaplan & Co. Sec., Inc. , Exchange Act Release No. 55,954,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,601, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2946 at
*19 (Dec. 18, 2006); In re Morgan Stanley, Litigation Release No. 19,693,
2006 SEC LEXIS 1052 at *2 (May 10, 2006).
75
In re Kelmoore Inv. Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8774,
Exchange Act Release No. 55,123, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,667,2007 SEC LEXIS 101, at *4 (Jan. 18, 2007).
76
In re Federated Inv. Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 52,839,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,167, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3038 at
*27 (Nov. 28, 2005) (requiring a Periodic Compliance Review at least once
every three years); In re Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 50,506, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,629, 2004 SEC
LEXIS 2318, at *37 (Oct. 8, 2004) (requiring a Periodic Compliance Review
at least every other year).
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Typically, settlements calling for the use of a compliance
consultant require approval of the consultant by the SEC
staff, 77 a timeline for submission of the consultant's
report(s), 78 and a promise that the defendant will adopt the
consultant's recommendations even in the event of a
principled disagreement. 79 Defendants do not have the
authority to terminate the independent consultant without
prior permission of the SEC staff. 80 They must authorize the
consultant to share information with the staff; all privileges
must be waived. 81 And, finally, the consultant is barred from
providing any ancillary services to the defendant and its
77

In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., Securities Act Release No. 8832,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,229, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,925, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1767, at *14 (Aug. 9, 2007) ("General American
shall retain, within 90 days of the date of entry of the Order, the services
of an Independent Compliance Consultant not unacceptable to the staff of
the Commission.").
78
In re Dunham & Assocs. Holdings, Inc., Securities Act Release No.
8740, Exchange Act Release No. 54,489, Investment Company Act Release
No. 27,495, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2099, at *11 (Sept. 22, 2006) ("At the end of
the review, which in no event shall be more than 150 days after the date of
this Order, [the defendant] shall require the Independent Consultant to
submit to [the defendant] and to Briane Nelson Mitchell or another
designated representative of the Commission's Pacific Regional Office in
Los Angeles an Independent Consultant's Report. The Independent
Consultant's Report shall describe the review performed and the
conclusions reached and shall include any recommendations deemed
necessary to make the policies and procedures adequate and address the
deficiencies identified in [a previous section of this] Order.").
79
In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,606,
SEC LEXIS 2332, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2006) ("[The defendant] shall adopt all
recommendations in the report of the Compliance Consultant; provided,
however, [reference here to a mediation procedure]. In the event [the
defendant] and the Compliance Consultant are unable to agree . . . [the
defendant] shall abide by the determinations of the Compliance
Consultant.").
80
In re A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55,692,
2007 SEC LEXIS 891, at *6 (May 2, 2007).
81
Id. ("[The defendant] shall not be in and shall not have an attomeyclient relationship with the Independent Consultant and shall not seek to
invoke the attorney-client privilege or any other doctrine or privilege to
prevent the Independent Consultant from transmitting any information,
reports or documents to the Commission or the Commission's staff.").
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managers for a period of two years following completion of
the consultant's final report. 82
The scope of the consultant's work varies in these
settlements. Sometimes, the range of issues to be considered
by the consultant is broad; 83 at other times, the assignment

82

See, e.g., In re Aspen Tech., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8827,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,170, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1656, at *26 (July 31,
2007) (" ... [F) or the period of engagement and for a period of two years
from completion of the engagement, the Independent Consultant shall not
enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other
professional relationship with [the defendant], or any of its present or
former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents, respectively,
acting in their capacity as such.").
83
See, e.g., In re Vertical Capital Partners, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 55,177, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 2586, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 150, at *13 (Jan. 25, 2007) (authorizing the consultant to conduct
"a comprehensive review of Vertical's supervisory, compliance, and other
policies and procedures designed to prevent and detect conflicts of interest,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and federal securities law violations by Vertical
and its employees. This review shall include, but shall not be limited to, a
review of Vertical's policies and procedures in the areas of trade
processing, compensation of registered representatives, and the training of
registered and unregistered staff"); In re Fred Alger Mgmt. Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 55,118, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,663,
2007 SEC LEXIS 100 (Jan. 18, 2007) at *29 (authorizing the consultant to
conduct a "comprehensive review of Respondents' supervisory, compliance,
and other policies and procedures designed to prevent and detect breaches
of fiduciary duty, breaches of the Code of Ethics and federal securities law
violations by Respondents and their employees. This review shall include,
but shall not be limited to, a review of Respondents' market timing
controls, Respondents' sales and distribution practices, a review of the
Alger funds' pricing practices that may make those funds vulnerable to
market timing, a review of the Alger funds' utilization of short term
trading fees and other controls for deterring excessive short term
trading"); In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release
No. 8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *82 (Feb. 9, 2005)
(authorizing the consultant to conduct "a comprehensive review of BAS's
supervisory, compliance, and other policies and procedures designed to
prevent and detect conflicts of interest, breaches of fiduciary duty,
breaches of the Code of Ethics and federal securities law violations by BAS
and its employees related to the retail sale and retail brokerage order
processing of mutual funds") .
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is narrowly drawn. 84 Sometimes, and wisely, the detailed
scope of work is left to be worked out between the defendant
and the consultant, subject to the SEC's approval. 85 Though
there is little public information about the costs of these
arrangements (or the identity of the consultants selected),
the fees for a consultant may run as high as millions of
dollars each year. 86

E. Micromanagement By Consent
In some cases, SEC settlements prescribe changes in
corporate practices with remarkable specificity.
For
example, the SEC alleged that Charter Communications,
Inc., a cable provider, had ignored customer requests to

84
See, e.g., In re Aspen Tech. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8827,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,170, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1656, at *23 (July 31,
2007) (authorizing the consultant "to review Aspen's financial and
accounting policies and procedures relating to: (i) revenue recognition on
software licensing agreements, including the consideration of SOP 97-2
and documentation of that consideration; (ii) the signing and dating of
material sales contracts and purchase orders and the retention by Aspen's
corporate finance organization of all such contracts and purchase orders;
(iii) written documentation that all sales contingencies have been met in
material revenue transactions; (iv) the generation and issuance to
customers of sales invoices; and (v) the preparation and review of accounts
receivable confirmations. Aspen shall require the Independent Consultant
to also consider, based on his/her review, the nature and extent of Aspen's
Board of Directors training required to minimize the possibility of future
violations of the federal securities laws by Aspen, acting through its
finance and accounting employees").
85
See In re E*Trade Clearing LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 58,250,
2008 SEC LEXIS 1793, at *9 (July 30, 2008) ("E*Trade will require the
consultant, within sixty (60) days of the Consultant's engagement, to
develop a written plan of sufficient scope and detail to achieve the
regulatory review objectives set forth in Paragraph 14.d below.").
86
See Reisinger, supra note 35 (noting that one consultant, a former
federal judge, had submitted bills over a 16-month period totaling $7.2
million); Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A1 (describing arrangement by which former
Attorney General John Ashcroft was appointed as monitor in a criminal
case, resulting in a contract worth between $28 million and $52 million).
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discontinue service. 87 This permitted Charter to overstate its
subscriber base and thereby inflate its financial statements.
Charter's settlement of the case included detailed
undertakings on the subject of handling requests to
discontinue service. 88 It also specified the mechanism for
record-keeping for customers who were late in paying their
bills. 89 It prescribed a "bottom up" rather than a "top down"

87

In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,098,
2004 SEC LEXIS 1589 (July 27, 2004).
88
Id.
[The company will] adopt a zero tolerance policy on holding
or managing disconnects in order to inflate subscriber
numbers and terminate employee found to be managing or
holding disconnects for this purpose. In addition, Charter's
Chief Executive Officer will issue quarterly written
reminders to all employees regarding Charter's zero
tolerance policy for holding or managing disconnects in
order to inflate subscriber numbers.
ld. at *5.
89 ld.

[The company will] institute a formal written policy that
details disconnect procedures for terminating the service of
delinquent paying subscribers. This policy will require
that delinquent paying customers' service be terminated 60
to 75 days after their account balance becomes past due
("termination date") and that their balances be written off
to bad debt 90 to 110 days after their account balances
become past due ("write off date").
Charter may
specifically identify a few categories of subscribers that, for
historical business reasons, Charter permits to remain as
active subscribers for more than 75 days after a bill
becomes past due. Any exceptions Charter makes to allow
a delinquent paying customer to remain an active
subscriber after 75 days of non-payment shall be
documented, reviewed and approved by Key Market Area
management personnel at or before the close of each billing
cycle . . . .

I d.

HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 812 2008

No. 3:793]

CORPORATE THERAPEUTICS AT THE SEC

813

budgeting process for the company. 90 It even specified
revisions to the method of setting employee compensation. 91
This kind of micromanagement often occurs in cases
involving regulated entities.
In a case involving
misrepresentations by Edwards D. Jones & Co. about its
representatives' compensation in the sale of so-called 529
plans (investments for future educational costs), the
settlement included detailed undertakings governing the
marketing of these plans. 92 In a case against Bear, Stearns
involving late trading and market timing, the settlement
included a provision addressing the specifics of a new
compliance program. 93
Presumably, all these undertakings were approved by the
defendants' lawyers. Still, prescribing these practices so
90

Id. at *6.
Id.
92
In re Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., Securities Act Release No.
8520A, Exchange Act Release No. 50,910A, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1547, at *7
(July 13, 2007).
93
In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8668,
Exchange Act Release No. 53,490, Investment Company Act No. 27,262,
2006 SEC LEXIS 623, at *88 (Mar. 16, 2006).
91

Respondents shall establish, within 30 days after the entry
of this Order, a Compliance Hotline and appoint an
appropriate compliance or legal officer(s) to be available to
answer questions, on an anonymous basis, about business
practices or ethical issues and to receive complaints from
employees regarding any conduct that may be a cause for
concern. Employees shall be provided with the email
address and telephone number for the Compliance Hotline.
Respondents will also provide all employees with quarterly
compliance alerts identifying areas of interest and
providing the email and telephone numbers for the
Compliance Hotline ....

Id.; see also In re Bane of Am. Securities LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
55,466, 2007 SEC LEXIS 492, at *47-66 (Mar. 24, 2007) (detailing dozens
of items to implement the separation of market analysis from investment
banking); In re Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,788, 2005 SEC LEXIS 675, at *21-25 (Mar. 23, 2005)
(detailing procedures governing the selection of broker-dealers through
which the defendant may trade).
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narrowly may stifle mid-course correction and leave
managers wondering where to go for permission to adjust
arrangements that do not work.
Defendants would
undoubtedly prefer a "blank check" approach, in which they
undertake merely to find their own solution to a problem and
report the results to the SEC staff. 94

III. THE EVOLUTION OF THERAPEUTIC
UNDERTAKINGS
In preparing this Article, I interviewed eight lawyers who
either work in the SEC's Enforcement Division or represent
defendants in SEC enforcement proceedings. 95 Most of the
defense lawyers are also former SEC lawyers, so they were
able to describe the negotiation process from both sides of
the table. I promised each of these sources anonymity and
found them to be not only generous with their time but also
candid and thoughtful in their comments. What follows is a
compilation of their observations, highlighting issues upon
which they did not always agree.
First, two of the sources offered a historical perspective
on the use of corporate therapeutics by the SEC. The
practice began during the tenure of former Enforcement
Chief Stanley Sporkin. 96 Sporkin particularly liked to
require the appointment of consultants in cases involving
regulated entities-his thought was that putting a
consultant in place had the effect of "extend[ing] the power
of the Enforcement staff."97 In Sporkin's view, the consultant

94

See, e.g., In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No.
8756, Exchange Act Release No. 54,806, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2701, at *2
(Nov. 21, 2006).
95
These interviews were conducted as follows: Source #1 (Sept. 26,
2007; Nov. 15, 2007); Source #2 (Sept. 27, 2007); Source #3 (Oct. 1, 2007);
Source #4 (Oct. 2, 2007); Source #5 (Oct. 2, 2007); Source #6 (Oct. 15,
2007); Source #7 (Oct. 22, 2007); Source #8 (Oct. 22, 2007).
96
Judge Sporkin was director of the division from 1974-1981. John F.
Berry, An SEC Legacy: Sporkin Known As Tough, Open, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 1981, at El.
97
Source #1.
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was there to serve as the "eyes and ears" of the staff and to
"complete their investigation from the inside. "98
Later, the Enforcement Division broadened the use of
compliance consultants and other therapeutic sanctions to
cases involving public issuers. 99 Sporkin's staff became "very
aggressive" in their use of therapeutic settlement termsrequiring "audit committees, different kinds of directors,
[and] restructurings." 100 Settlements then, as now, were
"heavily negotiated." 101
A. The Enforcement Staffs Approach to Therapeutic
Undertakings
Today, the Enforcement staff decides early on if it intends
to seek therapeutic sanctions. Three factors are important in
this determination: (1) whether the company's wrongdoing
was a product of "dismal internal controls" or was an isolated
incident; (2) what the company has done proactively since
the discovery of the wrongdoing to remediate the problem;
and (3) how fast the settlement discussions proceed. 102
(Ironically, a quick settlement may be more likely to include
therapeutic provisions than a settlement that comes later,
after the company has cleaned up its own mess.)
In most cases that have arisen since passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 103 the defendant had already adopted
various types of compliance programs. 104 Most well-lawyered
companies, upon learning of the SEC's interest, have also
conducted an internal investigation and their audit
committees have adopted some form of remediation plan. 105
98
99

100
101

ld.
ld.
Source #3 .
ld.

102

Source #2.
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
(Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
104
Source #3.
105
The template for a remediation plan is the so-called "Seaboard
Report." See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
103
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So, "by the time the staff gets to [the negotiation phase],
much of the correction has already been done." 106 In the
worst cases, moreover, old management has been replaced. 107
The task for the Enforcement staff, then, is to determine
whether further corrective steps are required, in addition to
the steps already taken "voluntarily."108 There are resources
available for making this determination-the Enforcement
staff lawyer's own experience in other cases, lawyers in the
Corporation Finance division, the Chief Accountant's office,
and sometimes consultants engaged by the Commission. 109
"Hopefully, Enforcement consults within the Commission,"
but that may not always occur. 110 As noted below, much
depends on who the lawyers are during the investigatory
phase. The process is particularly unpredictable when it
involves the regional offices rather than the Enforcement
Division's main office in Washington, D.C. 111 (The regional
offices are said by my sources to be "quite independent.") 112
B. Negotiating the Settlement Terms
Once it is clear that Enforcement wants to impose some
type of therapeutic sanction, the Enforcement staff typically
presents a first draft of a settlement agreement, cut-andpasted from earlier settlements. 113 (The Enforcement staff
does not like it when the defendant submits a first draft.) 114
The draft has typically been prepared by the junior-most
person on the Enforcement team. Sometimes, the draft is
"over the top" and "doesn't reflect the fact that a settlement
has been [or is likely to be] reached." 115 Often, the first draft

106

113

Source #3.
Source #4.
See infra Part IV.
Source #3.
Id.
Source #4.
Source #1.
Id.

11•

Id:

115

Id.

107
108

109

11o
111
112
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includes a proposal for the appointment of a full-service
compliance monitor.U 6
Then, the defense lawyers chip away at the proposed
therapeutic provisions, both by exchange of "mark-ups" of
the document and by in-person meetings with the
Enforcement staff. 117 Defense lawyers try to avoid the most
burdensome provisions-appointment of a monitor with
broad supervisory powers, appointment of any form of
compliance consultant, and a requirement that the company
hire new people, in that order. 118
The issue of compliance consultants is often a stumbling
block because "everybody hates them." 119 Not only are they
expensive and disruptive, many clients believe that inclusion
of a consultant in the terms of an SEC settlement agreement
sends an adverse signal to the market. 12° For marketwatchers who are paying attention, the staffs insistence on
inclusion of a consultant provision in a settlement involving

Id.
!d.
118
Source #2. They also try to avoid the inclusion in the settlement of
an obey-the-law injunction. Clients believe such injunctions send an
adverse market signal.
They also may have significant collateral
consequences, especially for regulated entities. Source #1.
119
Source #1. The resistance to the use of compliance consultants was
a common theme in my interviews with defense counsel. Consultants are
"very intrusive; companies hate them." Source #4. Their presence is
"painful, time-consuming, and colossally expensive." Source #2. Even
where consultants generate good recommendations, "the cost usually far
outweighs the benefit." Source #8. One lawyer reports that a consultant
for one of his clients "ran up a nine-figure bill with no discernible benefit
to the company or the shareholders." !d. Another concedes "you do hear
stories of consultancies that have lost their way." Source #7. Some
consultants feel they "must justifY themselves" so, after 18 months of
investigation, they "come up with a bunch of busy work for people to do" in
order to make their work seem valuable. Id. As a result, "firms are [often]
forced to do things that don't make sense." Source #1. The prevailing
view among my sources was that "few [law or consulting firms] can do this
work well." !d.
120
Source #8.
116
117
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a public issuer "often signal[s] continued mistrust by the
staff of someone in senior management." 121
In these discussions, any thought of a full-service monitor
virtually always disappears 122 and, in Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ("FCPA") cases, the "consultant" provision
almost never disappears.
That is, FCPA settlements
requiring the engagement of a compliance consultant are
now "routine."123 In other cases, however, insistence on the
inclusion of therapeutic provisions depends largely on the
Enforcement Division's lawyers' sense of the defendant's
current corporate culture. "If the staff thinks the company is
rotten, they'll be more insistent" on therapeutic sanctions. 124
Often the outcome hinges on the key question-"who did you
fire?"I2s
The settlement process is often idiosyncratic. "Different
staff people have different issues." 126
That is, some
Enforcement lawyers "think [therapeutic provisions] are very
important" and are inclined to want to "micromanage" the
defendant. 127 Other Enforcement lawyers care much less
about these items and view them largely as "window
dressing." 128 To the second group, undertakings may "look
good" but are unlikely to have much effect on the company.
These lawyers prefer to seek entry of an obey-the-law
injunction-the "crown jewel" of SEC settlement

121

Source #1.
As noted above, full-service monitors are usually appointed only in
cases involving criminal charges. See supra note 35.
123
Source #2.
124
Source#l. A former SEC lawyer who reviewed this Article
mentioned a related scenario that might give rise to a demand for
therapeutic sanctions. Not only do SEC lawyers react to what they
perceive to be untrustworthiness on the part of corporate executives, they
may also react to what they consider disrespect from the company's
lawyers. "Sometimes it's personal." I d.
125
Source #3. See also infra Part V.
126
Source #3.
127
-source #2.
126 Id.
122

HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 818 2008

No. 3:793]

CORPORATE THERAPEUTICS AT THE SEC

819

negotiations 129-and leave the details of future compliance to
the company. 130
So, the outcome of settlement discussions may depend in
part on the specific staff lawyers involved. And, it is
sometimes necessary to take remedial issues "up the chain"
within the Enforcement Division to the senior staff.
Experienced defense lawyers have found that senior level
staffers are often "[more] sensitive to invading state law
issues." 131 They are also "[more] mindful of imposing
undertakings." 132 They're willing to offer "a lot of due
process" 133 and sometimes substitute their judgment for that
of the over-eager junior staff lawyers. 134 Overall, however,
"there is not a lot of central direction on this kind of thing." 135
There are often other issues on the table. For example,
there is the question of the size of the civil penalty. That is,
just as negotiations proceed on the subject of therapeutic
sanctions, they also proceed on the amount of the penalty. 136
Tradeoffs are never explicit-the SEC staff would "recoil at
the thought that defendants could buy their way out" of a
penalty simply by accepting more intrusive undertakings. 137
129

Source #4.
See, e.g., Veritas Software Corp., Litigation Release No. 20008,
2007 SEC LEXIS 341 (Feb. 21, 2007) (noting that the defendant had
agreed to pay a $30 million civil penalty and submit to entry of an obeythe-law injunction); Tenet Healthcare Corp., Litigation Release No. 20067,
2007 SEC LEXIS 610, at *1-2 (Apr. 2, 2007) (a $10 million penalty and an
obey-the-law injunction).
131
Source #1.
132 !d.
133 !d.
134
!d. "When you get up high enough-past the people who are
wedded to the case"-a lawyer can often soften the terms of a settlement.
This may include denial of the lower-level staff's "emotional demands for
scalps." !d.
135
Source #4.
136
Under current procedures, the Commission must set the
parameters for a civil penalty before settlement negotiations begin.
Thomas 0 . Gorman & William McGrath, A Guide for Avoiding Liability:
Understanding Key SEC Enforcement Policies and Priorities, CoRP. Gov.
ADVISOR, July/Aug. 2008, at 21.
137
Source #2.
130
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But many companies are just "desperate for closure."138 So,
there are tradeoffs. And "sometimes corporate governance
undertakings are way down the list." 139 That is, a firm may
be anxious to reduce its penalty from, say, $150 million to
$100 million, and if the cost of that is the acceptance of
intrusive therapeutic provisions, including the appointment
of a consultant or consultants, the company will willingly
sign off. 140

C. Selection of the Compliance Consultant
Where a compliance consultant is part of the settlement
package, the identity of the consultant is negotiable with the
staff but is rarely contested. 141 That is, the company comes
up with a suggested name or names. 142 The staff then spends
some time talking with the person(s) selected. 143 The focus of
the interview is primarily on two issues-the consultant's
"independence" and "perspective" on enforcement issues. 144
The staff takes the interview process "very seriously."145
Thus, well-advised companies know to turn to former SEC or
138

Source #1.
ld.
140
Another consideration sometimes on the table during settlement
negotiations is whether the defendant will be charged with a violation of
Rule 10b-5. Such charges, even if settled, "virtually guarantee a class
action, [preclude] the use of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward looking
statements for 3-5 years, and make the issuer ineligible for the 'well
known seasoned issuer' (WKSI) offering procedures. Much mischief is done
trying to avoid a fraud charge -- [payment of] higher fines, terminations of
key employees, agreeing to findings of iffy reporting violations, re-styling
an SEC antifraud injunction as an order enforcing NASD rules, etc."
E-mail from source to author, Nov. 13, 2007 (on file with the author).
141
Source #4.
142
Typically, the names are generated by the company's outside
counsel. From their perspective, the characteristics of a good consultant
are (1) someone who will act responsibly-"they will recognize that the
shareholders are paying their bill" and (2) someone with credibility with
the SEC. Source #8.
143
Source #6.
144 Id.
145 ld.
139
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DOJ staffers as their candidates-"somebody [the staff
lawyers] trust." 146
It is also important, though, that the company can live
with the consultant it has chosen, especially one with a
broad remit. It is critical, therefore, to find a consultant who
not only will be acceptable to the SEC staff, 147 but who also
will "get" the defendant's business. 148 The consequences of
making a bad selection-and having to live with unhelpful
recommendations-can be costly. 149 So, the company has to
be "very careful" in choosing its consultant. 150
The consultant's scope of authority is also an issue for
negotiation. Regulated entities are generally very familiar
with these issues and have certain priorities for the text of
their settlements. The principal priority is flexibility in
adopting a compliance consultant's recommendations. 151
Companies want to be able to tweak those recommendations
and, if necessary, seek relief from the staff. Public issuers
may have less incentive to negotiate the details. Moreover,
"[i]f the staff is insisting on a [compliance consultant] for
[such a defendant], the alternatives by that point are far, far
worse, and the company is simply at the mercy of the
staffer."152

146
Source #4. The selection of SEC alumni as consultants may involve
more than backscratching. A company may select an SEC (or DOJ) alum
as its consultant because "they know what's likely to matter to the staff."
Source #6.
147
Actually, the language of SEC settlements is that a consultant be
"not unacceptable" to the staff. See supra note 77.
148
Source #6.
149
Dealing with consultants--even good consultants-can be
"enormously frustrating and time-consuming." Source #1.
Most
consultants "over-investigate." Id. They are also distracting-their
presence month after month "can cripple the Controller's office." Id.
150
Source #6.
151
Source #1.
152

/d.
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D. The Compliance Consultant In Action
Once the consultant is appointed, he or she is likely to
maintain contact with the SEC staff while doing the work.
This may involve exchange of documents or other
information. Consultants try to keep the staff informed of
how the work is going and extract some "general feedback"
on the adequacy of their work. 153 The nature of these
conversations, like the form of settlement, is often
idiosyncratic to the lawyers involved. It may also depend on
the prior relationship, if any, between the consultant and the
Enforcement Division staff member(s) assigned to the case.
(Many consultants have close personal friends within the
agency.)
As noted above, most defense counsel believe that
compliance consultants "milk" their clients by running up
hours. 154 One of my sources who has served as a consultant
conceded as much: "[when acting as a consultant,] I might as
well do a really thorough job-no one will second-guess
me."1ss

When the consultant submits his or her final report, the
SEC's response depends on who's on the staff. 156 A few staff
lawyers routinely like to "send them back and ask for more.
[With other lawyers, the reports] just go into the drawer." 157

153
Source #6. Sometimes this feedback is very directive. "Have you
interviewed this person? Why not? Have you looked at this issue? Why
not?" Source #8. The staff does have influence over the tasks the
consultant takes on. They often seem to defense counsel to be "more the
client than the client." ld.
154
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
155
Source #8.
156
Source #4.
157
ld. Source #6 disagrees with Source #4's perception. She doubts
these reports go "into the drawer" and insists that "the staff takes these
remedies seriously." Still, the report and recommendations would have to
be "pretty bad" for the staff to ask for revisions or further work. A
consultant who has maintained contact with the staff should not end up
with that problem. Source #6.
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And, often, of course, the staff lawyer most knowledgeable
about the case has moved on. 158
Interestingly, there are few repeat players serving as
compliance consultants. 159 Rather, the work is "very spread
out." 160 And some qualified people turn down the opportunity
to serve as consultants. "[One has to] be careful which ones
to take-there is a penalty." 161 (That is, in most SEC
settlements, anyone serving as a consultant is disqualified
from providing any additional services to the defendant for a
period of two years.) 162

E. Therapeutic Sanctions Today
Depending on whom one asks, SEC demands for
therapeutic sanctions may be on the rise 163 or may have
peaked. 164 (At least one lawyer believes the SEC staff is
tiring of the use of compliance consultants, especially in
cases involving regulated entities. 165 Another believes that
the SEC staff is "less adventuresome across-the-board" today
than it was just three years ago. 166 ) Still, the SEC staff
continues to insist upon therapeutic provisions in many SEC
cases.

IV. STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THERAPEUTIC
SANCTIONS
The conventional wisdom is that defendants can minimize
both the breadth and depth of therapeutic sanctions through
a series of corrective gestures prior to and during settlement
discussions. Specifically, "if you can say 'management has

158
169
160
161
162

163
164
165

166

Source #1.
Source #6.
ld.
Id.
See supra note 82.
Source #6.
Source #7.
Source # 1.
Source #7.
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turned over, we have a new board, etc.,' [you] may avoid
[therapeutic] terms." 167
The template (or "Bible"168 ) for making an argument like
this is found in the "Seaboard Report" issued by the
Commission in 2001. 169 The Seaboard Report sets out the
factors that the Commission will take into account in
deciding "whether to bring an enforcement action, pursue
reduced charges, seek lighter sanctions, or include
mitigating language in any SEC release and/or resolution of
enforcement actions." 170 Some of the considerations set out
in the Seaboard Report include whether the company
conducted a thorough investigation, employed outside
experts to conduct the investigation, adopted new internal
control procedures, and removed the people responsible for
the misconduct. 171
Sometimes, Seaboard-type efforts result in a settlement
that does not include any therapeutic provisions. For
example, Coca-Cola Company engaged in significant
corrective activities during the course of an SEC enforcement
proceeding in which the company was alleged to have
engaged in a version of "channel stuffing" in order to meet its
earnings targets. 172 Coke's management established an
Ethics and Compliance Office to administer its Code of
Business Conduct, created a Disclosure Committee to assist
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in
fulfilling their obligations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
and arranged for the Board's audit committee to employ

167

Source #1.
Source #4.
169
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of
Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No.
44,969, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Oct. 23, 2001).
17
° Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal
Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and
Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1109 (2006).
171
/d. "Everybody knows [the Seaboard factors) by heart." Source #7.
172
In re Coca-Cola Co., Securities Act Release No. 8569, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,565, 2005 SEC LEXIS 861, at *4 (Apr. 18, 2005).
168
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experienced legal counsel. 173
The resulting settlement
consisted simply of a cease-and-desist order. 174
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company similarly engaged in
corrective activities following allegations that the company
had materially misstated its international petroleum
reserves. 175 It conducted an internal investigation, reported
its findings to the SEC, significantly enhanced its audit
function, restructured some of its subsidiaries (including
their boards), and improved its training programs
worldwide. 176 The result, in addition to payment of a $120
million civil penalty, was an agreement that Royal Dutch
would spend a further $5 million to develop and implement a
"comprehensive internal compliance program under the
direction and oversight of [the defendant's] Legal
Director . . . . Shell [further proposed] to report to the
Commission staff within twelve months on the expenditure
of the funds and the status ofthe compliance program." 177
In many other cases, however, significant remedial efforts
have failed to avert the inclusion of therapeutic sanctions in
SEC settlements. In the Millennium Partners case, the
defendants in the period leading up to the settlement had
created the positions of Chief Legal Officer and Chief
Compliance Officer, and had retained an independent
consultant whose recommendations the company had
adopted. 178 The Enforcement Division nevertheless insisted
on appointment of a compliance consultant approved by the
Commission. 179
Cardinal Health, Inc., too, "hired a new chief financial
officer, chief accounting officer and controller, and enhanced
173

Id. at *22-23.
Id. at *25.
175
In re Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Exchange Act Release No.
50,233, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1832, at *38 (Aug. 24, 2004).
176
ld. at *38-40
177
Id. at *2, 45-46.
178
In re Millennium Partners, L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8639,
Exchange Act Release No. 52,863, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,172, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3078, at *21-22 (Dec. 1, 2005).
179
ld. at *29.
174
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its Finance staff to support the size and growth of Cardinal
Health. The company also created the position of chief ethics
and compliance officer .... "180 Here, too, however, the SEC
staff insisted on appointment of a compliance consultant. 181
Indeed, there are many cases in which the pre-settlement
remediation efforts of the defendant are noted-sometimes
at length-but the SEC nevertheless insists on intrusive
therapeutic sanctions. 182 What distinguishes these cases
from those cases in which the defendant's remedial efforts
are persuasive in avoiding therapeutic sanctions? The
sources interviewed for this Article made clear that it is
difficult to answer this question and therefore to advise their
clients on "how much remediation is enough." 183 It will not
suffice, however, simply to claim "we've cleaned up our own
house." Apparently, something more is needed.
According to my sources, the challenge for defense
lawyers is to persuade the staff that their clients' remedial
actions have been (or are likely to be) sufficient to protect
investors, whatever that means. One way to try to satisfy
18
° Cardinal Health Announces Resolution of SEC Investigation; U.S.
Attorney's Office Closes Related Inquiry, PHARMA INVESTMENTS, VENTURES
& LAw WEEKLY, Aug. 12,2007, at 684.
181
Cardinal Health, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20,212, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 1622, at *4 (July 26, 2007).
182
See, e.g., In re Fidelity Mgmt. Research Co., Investment Company
Act Release No. 28,185, 2008 SEC LEXIS 507, at *81-83, 85 (Mar. 5, 2008)
(noting that the defendant company had disciplined approximately two
dozen employees, changed several of its policies and procedures, and
reorganized the management of its equity trading operations, and the
company's parent had substantially increased its ethics office's funding for
technology and personnel, but the staff still required the engagement of a
compliance consultant); In re RS Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,627, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2299, at *12-13, 23 (Oct. 6, 2004)
(detailing defendant's extensive remedial efforts then concluding
settlement with the appointment of a compliance consultant); In re PA
Fund Mgmt. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50,384, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,598, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2085, at *26, 33 (Sept. 15, 2004).
183
"How much remediation is enough? Great question. I think ...
much depends on what [the Enforcement lawyers] ate for breakfast."
Source #1. "Is the staff m.: ved by [remedial efforts]? I'm not sure .... I'm
not sure [what] works." Source #8.
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the SEC is to ''brag ... about how much money [the company
has] spent" on remediation. 184 Another is to preemptively
hire an outside consultant known to the SEC. 185 The key,
though, is to build the staff's trust in the company's current
management. 186 That means defense counsel must try to
persuade the staff either that the case involved a "bad apple
in a good barrel ... ; or a couple of bad apples but we have
been able to spin off or close down that part of the
operation."187 When those narratives are unavailable, the
next best option is to convince the staff that "we've identified
the problem and we've identified the solution."188 That is,
part of the defense counsel's job is to persuade the staff that
the problem giving rise to the violation of the securities laws
was "relatively easy to describe and relatively easy to
ameliorate." 189 Then, counsel can make the case that there is
no need for any additional forms of "imposed reform."
Rather, the company should be permitted to design its own
solution that fits its particular business. There is no need to
hire a consultant who will "drop in from the sky." 190
If all these narratives are implausible, and the cause of
the problem was indeed complex and systemic, then defense
has
a
more
challenging (and
possibly
counsel
insurmountable) task. She must assure the staff that the
client has identified and reorganized faulty systems,
removed complicit participants in the scheme, and
meaningfully changed the corporate culture. She must, in
short, persuade the staff that the changes claimed are real
and not merely atmospheric. And if that fails, she at least
must be able to argue "(1) we take you [the SEC] seriously

184

Source #2.
Source #8.
186
Source #7.
187
Id. Hess and Ford caution that "bad apple" arguments like this are
inherently suspect. In many cases, they suggest, such claims of reform are
not to be believed. Hess & Ford, supra note 62 (manuscript at 38).
186
Source #7.
1s9 Id.
19o Id.
185
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and (2) we're acting responsibly and we really want to do the
right thing. "191

V. A WORD ON FIRING SENIOR EXECUTIVES
Several of the sources for this Article suggested that a key
factor in avoiding or minimizing therapeutic sanctions is a
decision to remove top-level executives. Indeed, sometimes
the Enforcement staff lawyers "make it clear that there will
be no settlement unless so-and-so is fired. (This is never in
writing.)" 192 "They always want to be briefed on personnel
changes" and they respond to these reports with informative
body language. 193 In these cases, "the staff doesn't care about
[the details of remedial efforts]. They certainly don't care
about corporate governance or whether someone can move
up 10 rungs on the ISS rankings. They care about bad
people. They signal their concerns [about those they regard
as bad people] loud[ly] and clear[ly]-even people they're not
willing to sue." 194
One of my sources suggested that, sometimes, replacing
senior management officials may be a higher priority for
defense lawyers than for the SEC staff. According to this
lawyer, immediately after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the settlement process often included "an unfortunate
tendency [on the part of defense counsel] to assume the only
way to mollify the staff was to fire senior managers whether
they deserved it or not." 195 "People are less fearful now," he
says, and the defenestration of top managers in anticipation
of settlement is less common than it was just two years
ago.19s
Still, some negotiations stall on this issue. And many
SEC investigations are known to have resulted in the
removal of senior executives. The AIG settlement, for
191
192

1e3
194
195

196

Source #8.
Source #1.

Id.
Id.
Source #7.

Id.
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example, noted the removal of the company's CEO and CFO
as among the company's remedial measures. 197 The boards
at Putnam Investments, Hollinger International, and Royal
Ahold, among others, are also understood to have forced the
resignations of their CEOs and others before settling with
the SEC. Many of these removals may in fact have been
market-driven. On the other hand, the staffs insistence may
have played a key role. It is impossible to know how much
influence SEC negotiations had in any one of these cases. It
is also impossible to know to what degree the Commission
supports the staffs hard-ball position, given its protestations
about not wishing to "intrude" into the board's prerogatives.198

VI. AGENCY EXPERTISE
We have seen in the foregoing sections evidence of the
widespread use of therapeutic sanctions in SEC settlements.
One might fairly question whether the SEC Enforcement
staff has the expertise to craft such provisions. Lawyers
typically have little or no organizational leadership
experience, and this is especially true of lawyers working in
law enforcement agencies. 199 Their inexperience can lead to
three types of errors in prescribing guidelines for
organizational change: (1) over-intrusiveness; (2) underintrusiveness; and (3) problems associated with delegating
authority, especially to largely unaccountable outside
compliance consultants.
It might be one thing to expect SEC staffers to have a
detailed understanding of the needs and limitations of SECregulated entities. We find many therapeutic provisions in
197
American Int'l Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,560, 2006
SEC LEXIS 277, at *5 (Feb. 9, 2006).
198
See supra note 58.
199
See, e.g., Wray & Hur, supra note 170, at 1185 ("Prosecutors know
their way around a courtroom and a grand jury investigation but are
unlikely to have developed meaningful expertise in the reform of highly
regulated industries ... Business organizations are right to be leery of the
potential consequences of well-meaning but unsophisticated advice from
criminal prosecutors on how best to ensure legal compliance.").
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settlements reached with such firms. Interestingly, many of
these settlements include the appointment of compliance
consultants/00 which may reflect either fatigue or risk
aversion (or both) on the part of the staff. These settlements
may also reflect special enforcement objectives-and a
willingness to be less mindful of state law prerogatives-in
dealing with regulated entities. 201
But what about complex non-regulated firms (public
issuers)?
Redesigning the managerial structures and
operating rules, let alone the cultures, of such firms is a
highly-sophisticated, time-consuming task. Redesigning the
rules in an organization that has engaged in unlawful
behavior is certain to be more challenging.
Consider the types of therapeutic provisions I have
catalogued here: new compliance structures, new accounting
systems, new board procedures, and new training programs
from the top to the bottom of the corporate hierarchy. Are
these the kinds of projects that SEC lawyers can reasonably
design? And, assuming the designs are really the product of
the defendants' lawyers, or consultants who themselves are
frequently lawyers, can SEC lawyers really tell the
difference between a good corrective plan and a poor one?202
Lawyers often misjudge reform programs because they
overestimate the importance of "process" rather than
200

See, e.g., In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
56,634, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2331, at *10 (Oct. 10, 2007) (requiring
engagement of a consultant to confirm that failures with respect to the
preparation of trading confirmations have been eliminated); In re Morgan
Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,726, 2007 SEC LEXIS 982, at
*24 (May 9, 2007) (requiring engagement of a consultant to examine the
defendant's retail order handling practices); In re A. G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55,692, 2007 SEC LEXIS 891, at *12 (May
2, 2007) (requiring engagement of a consultant to examine practices
relating to "market timing").
201
Source #7. According to this lawyer, the SEC staff"tend to be more
prescriptive for regulated entities [than for public issuers]." With
regulated entities, they are "somewhat less shy" about intervening. Id.
202
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV 71, 112-13 (noting that
neither administrative agencies nor judges are likely to be "particularly
adept" at evaluating corporate reform proposals).
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focusing on true behavioral change. 203 They also consistently
underestimate the full range of costs associated with the
implementation of reform programs. 204 These costs are both
direct and indirect and include a rising level of mistrust
within the firm, a decline in activity that is motivated by
loyalty or reciprocity, and a decline in productivity. 205
"Reform" agendas imposed from the outside are especially
suspect-they often breed employee cynicism and may even
generate more deception. 206
One might argue that the SEC enforcement lawyers have
been quite restrained in seeking (or, at least, achieving)
therapeutic changes in the governance and management of
public companies. As a general rule, SEC settlements have
been less intrusive than the settlements in many private
lawsuits. 207 The extensive (and expensive) monitoring that
sometimes occurs in criminal cases simply does not exist in
plain-vanilla SEC civil settlements. 208

203

Lawrence A. Cunningham, Evaluation and Response to Risk by
Lawyers and Accountants in the U.S. and the E. U.: The Appeal and Limits
of Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 267,
308-10 (2004); see also Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 476
(2001) (noting that lawyers often view corporate problems as "potential
legal claims, rather than as problems in need of systemic resolution").
204
Langevoort, supra note 202, at 74.
205
·Id. at 96.
206
See New Arthur Andersen Study Shows How to Develop an Ethics
Program That Works, PREVENTING BUSINESS FRAUD, May, 1999, at 1.
An ethics/compliance program that employees perceive as
having been created to help guide behavior, as well as to
establish and reinforce a shared set of company values
rooted in the company culture, will be significantly more
successful than a program that employees believe was
designed primarily for purposes of compliance. A program
that is perceived to have been developed to prevent, detect,
and punish violations of laws and regulations, or simply to
improve the company's image will be far less successful.

I d.
207

208

See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 35.
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Still, the SEC's haphazard approach to the terms of these
settlements is problematic, as is the likelihood that the
Enforcement staff lawyers often do not really know what
they are asking the parties to do.209 It is not enough,
moreover, to say that negotiated settlement terms are likely
to be better than court-ordered sanctions 210 or one-size-fits-all
regulation. 211 Expensive and intrusive mandates such as
those incorporated into SEC settlements should be based on
more than uninformed or idiosyncratic preferences. 212
As I will discuss below, the Enforcement staff should be
guided by principles consistently applied. For example,
imposition of a consultant should be regarded as "an extreme
measure warranted [only] when it appears that the
[defendant] will not, or cannot, take remedial action on its
own initiative."213 And, decisions regarding the use of
therapeutic sanctions should be centralized and the staff
assigned to the task should have a deep understanding of the
complexities and nuances of organizational reform. 214
209
As just one example, one of my sources in the Enforcement Division
opined that management "may not mind" the presence of a compliance
consultant. He added "that's just a guess." Source #5.
210
See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GoVERNMENT (2003)
(describing the ineffectiveness of courts in balancing the needs of complex
organizations).
211
See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REv. 342, 396 (2004) (noting the advantages of "designing institutions that
rely on self-discipline and self-surveillance" rather than relying on
government supervision).
212
See Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences
of Regulation, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 347, 348 (2005) ("[Corporations)
come in many different forms, and most of them are complex organizations
that are often barely understood, even by those who spend their entire
lives in them. To determine how these organizations are likely to respond
to different stimuli, we need some systematic knowledge that goes beyond
mere intuition.").
213
In re Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., Initial Decisions Release
No. 296, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2368, at *211 (Sept. 15, 2005).
214
It appears, for example, that "older" companies are less adaptable
to reform than "younger" companies. Additionally, companies with diverse
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VII.INVESTOR PROTECTION
In addition to questioning the SEC's expertise in
corporate governance, one might also ask whether there is
any value to corporate therapeutics. That is, what benefit
accrues to a corporation and its shareholders when, as part
of a settlement with the SEC, the company undertakes to
Recent studies have
change its governance practices?
concluded that only a handful of corporate governance
reforms-typically not those incorporated into SEC
settlement documents-are demonstrably related to
corporate performance. 215 "[T]he empirical evidence [on most
workforces are more adaptable than companies with culturally
homogeneous workforces.
Juan D. Carrillo & Denis Gromb, Cultural
Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 743, 745
(2007). These findings would suggest that the format and emphasis of
training programs should vary from defendant to defendant and be more
intense in change-resistant firms.
215
Bebchuk et al. argue that only six governance items-staggered
boards, limits on shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority
requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter
amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes-are demonstrably
related to shareholder value.
(Each correlates to a reduction in
shareholder value.) Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What
Matters in Corporate Governance?, Harvard Law School John M. Olin
Center Discussion Paper No. 491 (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract_id=593423. Brown and Caylor confirm that the absence of a
staggered board and the absence of poison pills are positively related to
firm value.
Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate
Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. AND PuB. POL'y 409, 412
(2006). They also find that five additional items-no option re-pricing
within the past three years; option grants averaging less than 3% of the
shares outstanding within the past three years; strong directorial
attendance records (all directors attended at least 75% of the meetings or
had a valid excuse for non-attendance); governance guidelines in the
annual proxy statement; and stock ownership requirements for directorsare "key drivers" of firm valuation. Id. at 411.
In a related paper, Brown and Caylor identifY five items that are
significantly and positively related to both return on assets (ROA) and
return on equity (ROE): a nominating committee comprised solely of
independent outside directors; lack of authorization to issue blank check
preferred stock; non-employees (e.g., outside directors) do not participate
in company pension plans; at least one member of the board has

HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 833 2008

834

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 2008

governance reforms'] correlation with shareholder value is
limited or mixed or both, and does not prove decisively that
they cause increases in value." 216
There are also grave doubts whether many corporate
compliance programs are effective in transforming corporate
cultures. Here, too, recent studies conclude that "little
evidence exists to support [the] assumption that internal
compliance structures reduce the incidence of prohibited
conduct within organizations."217 Indeed, the "most recent
and methodologically sound studies [find] no significant
correlation between the most widely used internal
compliance structures and reduced organizational misconduct."218
In other words, most compliance programs,
especially those endorsed by government regulators, may be
"largely window -dressing. "219
If these programs were cost-free, or even if they were
costly but otherwise harmless, it might not matter. But we
now understand that therapeutic sanctions are not free and
not harmless. As noted above, governance interventions can
have unintended and even harmful consequences. 220 And,
unfortunately, no one to date has done a thoughtful costbenefit analysis of the therapeutic sanctions the SEC

participated in an ISS-accredited director education program; and average
options granted in the past three years as a percentage of shares
outstanding did not exceed three percent. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus
D. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance (2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1072384.
216
Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 251, 303 (2005). See also Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good
Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics, 18 AcAD. OF MGMT.
EXEC. No. 1, at 108 (2004) (many so-called "reforms" are based on "Wall
Street superstitions" and "cliches and myths, rather than on genuine
research").
217
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASHU. L.Q. 487,491 (2003).
218
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the
Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 591 (2005).
219
Krawiec, supra note 217, at 513.
220
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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employs. 221
Nevertheless, the Enforcement staff keeps
insisting upon these sanctions, as if "more board meetings,
more audit committee meetings, longer meetings, longer
meetings still, more certifications, more internal controls,
new, often untried documentation of those controls, added
auditing devices, beefed up gatekeepers, new gatekeepers,
[etc.]"222 were proven remedies for corporate wrongdoing.
They are not.

VIII.A CAUTIONARY TALE
In thinking about the problems presented by therapeutic
sanctions, consider the story of Bristol-Myers Squibb. In
2004, the company was charged by the SEC with falsifying
its financial statements through mechanisms including
"channel-stuffing'' and other manipulative accounting
devices. 223 In settling the case, the company agreed to
various remedial undertakings, including "the appointment
of an independent advisor to review, assess, and monitor
Bristol-Myers' accounting practices." 224 The "advisor" was a
former U.S. Attomey and a retired federal judge who pressed
the company to hire new senior financial executives, create
the position of chief compliance officer, and "adoptD a
healthy new attitude toward being a good corporate
citizen."225 Nevertheless, the company soon found itself in
trouble for inflating its drug prices on bills to insurers and
government agencies. Then, it got into even deeper trouble
for engineering (and then lying about) a secret non-compete

221

See infra Part IX, SEC Recommendation #2.
Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles?
Corporate Governance in the Post·Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 65, 66 (2006).
223
Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Agrees to Pay $150
Million to Settle Fraud Charges, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004105.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
224 Id.
225
Sue Reisinger, Doctor's Orders, CORP. CsL., Oct. 1, 2007, available
at http://www .law .com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC .j sp?id=900005491 068.
222
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agreement with another drug company to enhance its
position in the generic drug market. 226
Even though, unlike most consultants, the Bristol-Myers
advisor had prior experience as a monitor, 227 and even
though he had spent thirty-seven months on the job, the
Bristol-Myers
advisor
was
"stunned"
by
these
developments. 228 Perhaps this is explained by the fact that,
by the time the company was deeply in trouble, the advisor
was eighty-seven years old. Or, perhaps it is explained by
the mindset with which the advisor approached his work:
"[Judge] Lacey said he found the work exhilarating. He
hadn't wielded this much power in years. He attended
executive committee meetings, talked with any individual he
chose, and sent a team of [his law firm colleagues] to attend
dozens of other meetings and report back to him." 229
Even though this story is not typical of SEC civil
enforcement actions, 230 it illustrates some of the problems of
therapeutic interventions: (1) consultants are often selected
more for who they know than what they know; (2)
consultants paid by the hour (as most of them are) have both
the opportunity and motive to run up large bills without
regard to whether their work is valuable to the company;
and (3) to make their work look meaningful, consultants
have to unearth facts and make recommendations. However,
to have any lasting impact on the company, they must work
closely with senior management and develop strong ties of
trust. The first course of action may be costly and fruitless.
The second may make the consultant so comfortable that he
becomes ineffective in bringing about change.
The Bristol-Myers Squibb case also suggests another
important lesson. The process of selecting consultants and
"advisors" should be undertaken with care. The current
practice of appointing former SEC staffers looks,
Id.
Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230
All three of the allegations against Bristol-Myers Squibb included
Department of Justice charges of criminal violations.
22s

221
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unfortunately, like a protection racket. It ultimately may
discredit the Commission and its staff. Or, as seems likely to
occur with the Department of Justice, it may invite
legislative intervention. 231

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article has examined the use by the SEC of
therapeutic sanctions in civil enforcement actions. With
surprising frequency, we have found Enforcement Division
staff lawyers in these actions negotiating for removal of
senior executives, alteration of board practices, new
reporting relationships, delegation of key decisions to
consultants, and significant expenditures of shareholders'
funds.
Any discussion of the use of therapeutic sanctions has to
take place in a larger context. The settlement of SEC
charges involves a balancing of many factors: the nature of
the charges (fraud or non-fraud); the pendency of other
actions (criminal and civil); the burdens of a cease-and-desist
order versus the burdens of an injunction; the size of the civil
penalty; the reaction of the market and stakeholders; and
the necessity of a speedy resolution, among others. No one
factor will drive every settlement. Right now, however, the
Enforcement staff seems to be free-lancing its way through
discussions of governance and management issues. The
judgments of boards of directors are being displaced by those
of lawyers with little appreciation for how businesses grow.
The SEC should give some serious thought to the issues
raised by the persistent use of therapeutic sanctions.
Recognizing the value of "clarity, consistency, and
predictability" in sanctioning policy, 232 the Commission
should adopt a set of written guidelines governing the use of
therapeutic sanctions. These guidelines should include the
following general provisions:
231
See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Democrats Moue to Regulate Corporate
Monitors, LAW.COM, July 15, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id=1202422975044.
232
Statement Concerning Financial Penalties, supra note 23.
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(1) as a general rule, therapeutic sanctions should be
included in a settlement only where supported by clear and
convincing evidence that intervention is needed-the default
position for prospective relief should be non-intervention;
(2) the Enforcement Division ought not seek therapeutic
sanctions unless that demand is authorized in advance by
the Commission;
(3)the Enforcement Division should require the creation
of new board practices, governance arrangements, and
management structures only with the active involvement of
the independent members of the defendant's board;
(4) compliance consultants should be used sparingly and
only where it is clear that the problem is a result of (a)
systemic, multi-location, or multi-unit failures requiring
extensive oversight and rehabilitation and (b) unwillingness
or inability of management to address the systemic, multilocation or multi-unit problem;
(5) the scope of work for compliance consultants should be
carefully and narrowly defined in advance, and include a
good-faith estimate of the time required to complete the
work;
(6)the Enforcement Division should insist upon budgets
and fee caps for compliance consultants-the open-ended
arrangements now in place encourage abuse and over-billing.
In addition to written sanction guidelines, the SEC
should consider the following recommendations:
(1) the SEC staff should centralize its knowledge and
institutional memory concerning the use of therapeutic
sanctions;
(2)the Government Accountability Office (GAO) should
conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the SEC's
recent use of therapeutic sanctions in civil cases and the
findings of this report should (a) be made public and (b)
inform all future settlement negotiations;
(3) Enforcement Division lawyers should receive direction
and training on the appropriate use of therapeutic sanctions,
with periodic updates on emerging knowledge about
corporate governance practices and the efficacy of compliance
programs;
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(4) the SEC staff should identify a cadre of professional
compliance consultants rather than leaving it to defendants
to select whomever they wish. The current set-up ensures
that many first-time consultants re-invent the wheel. There
is also an appearance of impropriety involved in the
consistent appointment of compliance consultants who are
SEC alumni;
(5) the SEC should commission a study of alternatives to
therapeutic sanctions. These might include disclosure-based
alternatives (periodic reporting of progress toward
governance reform), collaborative engagement between the
SEC staff and companies' audit committees, periodic
unannounced SEC "examinations" of companies with noncompliance histories, or other processes designed to enhance
adherence to the rule of law;
(6)the SEC should insist upon transparency regarding
the use of compliance consultants in settled cases; at a
minimum, their identity and a report of their annual and
total compensation should be available to the public;
(7) compliance consultants should be required to submit
an "after-action" report to the SEC staff after each
engagement, detailing "lessons learned;"
(8)the performance of compliance consultants should be
measured by common metrics; their reports should be
produced "in a form that makes it possible to compare
experiences across firms." 233
At a more fundamental level, the Commission should
consider whether the use of its enforcement powers to
supplant the prerogatives of corporate boards and those who
elect them is either legitimate or desirable. This is not a new
question. 234

X. CONCLUSION
Roberta Karmel recently suggested that board
composition and structure, and corporate governance
233
234

Hess & Ford, supra note 62, manuscript at 51.
See generally ROBERTA 8. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION:

THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982).
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generally, are issues that "the SEC has been angling to
regulate for some time. "23s She had in mind the new
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but might as easily
have pointed to the actions of the Enforcement Division in
resolving civil cases with therapeutic settlements.
This Article examines the SEC's use of therapeutic
settlements, both with regulated entities and with public
It questions the effectiveness of these
companies.
settlements and the role of the SEC in shaping corporate
governance norms.

235

Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0 . DouglasThe Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate
Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L . 79, 81 (2005).
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